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Favourite 
Son
Eduard Shevardnadze was Gorbachev's closest confidant 
until he resigned last December, predicting a coup. Tony 
Phillips looks at the man who has now assumed the 
status of a Soviet prophet.
hen Eduard Shevardnadze resigned as 
Soviet foreign minister in December 
last year he created shock waves not 
just around the Soviet Union but 
around the world. Gorbachev himself was said 
to have been alarmed and surprised. The jolt 
was made all the greater by the explanation 
Shevardnadze gave: "Let this resignation be my 
protest against the impending dictatorship".
At the time, many Western analysts saw Shevardnadze's 
plea as an exaggeration. Now, following the August coup, 
it seems prophetic In view of all this it is informative to 
dwell a little on the personal history of Shevardnadze, 
once the sole non-Slav in die Politburo and possibly one 
of the most influential foreign ministers in modem his­
tory. Shevardnadze is particularly interesting not just 
because he played such a major part in undoing the old 
world order, but also because he and Gorbachev were, in 
the heyday of perestroika, such a dose double act
Shevardnadze, like Gorbachev, could easily have been 
viewed ten years ago as just another loyal apparatchik on 
die way up. He had actually gota little further in his career 
than Gorbachev, becoming first secretary of the Georgian 
Communist Party in 1972, when he was a personal 
favourite of Brezhnev. While Gorbachev never achieved 
this dubious status, other similarities between them were 
quite strong. Both shared the unusual background for 
communist superstars of an educational background in 
the humanities; Gorbachev's first degree was in law (an 
almost pointless area under the Soviet system of decree 
rather than rules), while Shevardnadze trained as an 
historian. Both were of the Khrushchev generation
(Shevardnadze is two years older than Gorbachev.) Both 
seemed imbued with a strong anti-stalinism—they were 
there when the victims began pouring back from the 
camps—but are nonetheless loyal to what they see as the 
values of sodalism. Like Khrushchev, both appear to have 
believed Soviet communism could work if only it were 
honesdy applied. Gorbachev moved quickly to dispense 
with the cult of the general secretary, while Shevardnadze 
had a formidable reputation as a eorruption-buster in 
Georgia.
As with Gorbachev, the personal history of Shevardnadze 
provides glimpses of the champion of glasnost he was to 
become. The line from Andropov to Gorbachev begins 
with the attempt to make the Soviet system work honest­
ly. Gorbachev took Andropov's anti-corruption fervour 
and added to it the crucial ingredients of glasnost and 
democracy. This set in train a process in the Soviet Union 
that has in ideological terms seen the dominant 'radical' 
ethic move from an economistic anti-market pro-state 
ownership approach to a political pro-democracy anti- 
oligarchy one.
Despite his historian's training, Shevardnadze had his 
greatest successes enforcing law and order on corrupt 
officials and economic criminals as the chief of the Geor­
gian police. This was his claim for promotion to Georgian 
party boss. However, once installed he was not slow to 
use his 'favourite' status to institute local economic 
reforms which, in fact, decriminalised some of the acts he 
had been prosecuting and raised the general economic 
output of die republic. Shevardnadze was by no means a 
liberal democratic angel, but neither was he the typical 
Brezhnevite flunky-cum-fat-cat.
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Two aspects of his different style as party boss before the 
Goibathev ascendancy are worth noting. First, he had a 
conciliatory approach to disputes. Confronted with a hos­
tile, stone-throwing crowd in Abkhazia in the late 70s, 
Shevardnadze simply stepped forward and confronted the 
leaders. He spent the rest of the night in discussion. Such 
actions indicate a degree of self-confidence unusual in any 
politidan, let alone a Soviet communist. 1 would argue that 
here we can see yet another parallel with Gorbachev, and 
farther I suspect drat, at bottom, the source of the self-con­
fidence for both men was that they were and perhaps still 
are believers. They believed in sodalism, they believed it 
could work and they believed in its explanatory power.
The second noteworthy action of Shevardnadze's career 
was his backing for the film Repentance. The quintessential 
destalinisation film, made by a Georgian and shot in a 
quasi-surrealist manner with strong religious overtones, 
Repentance shocked and delighted fUmgoers all over the 
Soviet Union on its general release in 1987. Shevardnadze 
threw his support behind the director Tenghiz Abuladze in 
1981, assured finanrial and production support via Geor­
gian television and then pushed the finished product past 
important Politburo members, including Yegor Ligachev.
As foreign minister, Shevardnadze presided over a series 
of momentous events which culminated in the end of the
Cold War. Apart from negotiating vital arms agreements, 
the Soviets have withdrawn from Afghanistan, allowed the 
collapse of Soviet-backed regimes in Eastern Europe, nor­
malised relations with China and opened diplomatic ties 
with South Korea. They also applied a fresh approach to 
the Middle East which put more emphasis on peace and 
stability than superpower rivalry.
Two things can be said of Soviet policy as it evolved under 
Shevardnadze. Firstly, it moved from a doctrinaire and 
ideologically-informed 'dass-confrontationisf1 policy to 
one of 'realism'. That is to say, Soviet foreign policy now 
presumes explicitly that states have interests which they 
seek to maximise while maintaining some degree of 
stability. Realism is, of course, also an ideological posi­
tion—but it is one that most other states subscribe to, 
particularly those of the West. The explicit adoption of this 
position undoubtedly helped dialogue between die Soviet 
Union and the West Secondly, Shevardnadze utilised the 
vocabulary of humanism in bargaining to great effect. It is 
still debatable whether the relinquishing of Gorbachev's 
and Shevardnadze's foreign policy was chiefly animated 
by weakness at home or a desire for an 'offensive peace 
initiative'. What is dear, however, is that the language in 
which they couched that policy privileges the idea of a 
world community in a manner which has often made the 
West, and especially the US, uncomfortable.
The ideologies of humanism and realism should be logical­
ly contradictory, but Shevardnadze combined them 
surprisingly successfully. The chief outcome was a strong 
emphasis on condliation of di sputes and a move away from 
reliance on military means for prevention of war. During 
the 19th Party Congress in 1989 Shevardnadze made a 
strong attack on traditional thinking in Soviet foreign 
policy, arguing that war could no longer be a rational basis 
for policy, and that national security was more than the sum 
of one's arsenal. He went on to demand further weapons 
reductions and described the Soviet stockpile of chemical 
weapons as barbaric.
Not only did Shevardnadze admit very early on that much 
of Soviet foreign policy had been wrong, he explidtly 
linked his changes in foreign policy to domestic changes. 
That Soviet foreign policy is made on the back of, and 
underpinned by, successful perestroika, was a continual 
theme in his speeches: hence his willingness to intervene 
occasionally in purely domestic matters. The most dramatic 
example came in December 1989 when Shevardnadze 
threatened to resign over the massacre of protesters in 
Tbilisi in April of that year. He said at the time: "Nothing 
and nobody can justify the deaths of innocent people."
The reasons for Shevardnadze's resignation in 1990 have 
been a matter of much conjecture. We have his own ex­
planation that it was a personal protest about the way 
things were heading. It can be added that it was logical that, 
after Yeltsin and other radicals left the party
servatives gained
the con-
ground, the liberals such as
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Shevardnadze and Yakovlev would follow the radicals. 
Some in the Soviet press speculated that the military-in­
dustrial complex had forced him out. A more sceptical view 
argues that Gorbachev had Shevardnadze in mind as the 
man to negotiate the new union treaty, but the wily foreign 
minister decided not to accept the poisoned chalice.
In the light of the August coup attempt, it might also be 
suggested that Gorbachev was faced with the same 
scenario last year, but elected to go along with the hard line. 
Shevardnadze, perceiving this as something of a coup in 
itself, left Whichever account is closest to the mark, the 
resignation was quite a momentous one—not simply be­
cause of the context, which was dramatic enough, but also 
because Eduard Shevardnadze may well go down as the 
first modem Soviet politician to retire willingly at the peak 
of his glory.
In February this year Shevardnadze popped up again with 
plans to establish an association to act as a think-tank on 
Soviet foreign policy. All the familiar Shevardnadze 
themes were present in his interviews; the importance of 
perestroika, the role an independent association might 
play in shaping foreign policy, the need to continue the 
ongoing processes and so forth. However, by July this year, 
the association had metamorphosed into something quite 
different: the Movement for Democracy. Among the 
leaders of the movement were: Shevardnadze, former Gor­
bachev political adviser Aleksandr Yakovlev and
eoonomistStanislav Shatalin. It also attracted support from 
Yeltsin's Russian vice-president, and leader of the Com­
munists for Democracy, Aleksandr Rutskoi.
This grouping, made up of many of Gorbachev's former 
allies, looked set to split the Communist Party in early 
August. It was certainly a place of refuge for those seeking 
to leave, including perhaps Gorbachev himself, eventually. 
When die coup took place, the Movement joined with 
Yeltsin's forces very quickly. It was certainly able, through 
the standing of its members, not just to rally popular 
support (Yeltsin's great strength), but also to hold back 
those in authority whose support was vital to the success 
of the coup. In the end, Shevardnadze did more than just 
protest against a coming dictatorship, he helped prevent 
it
So the double act of Shevardnadze and Gorbachev ended 
with Shevardnadze standing in a besieged Russian parlia­
ment, denouncing Gorbachev for his weakness towards 
the hardliners which had allowed the coup to happen. In 
the coming months, it seems certain that Eduard 
Shevardnadze, an architect of the end of the cold war, will 
play a new and important role as an architect of a new order 
for the Soviet Union itself.
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